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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARGARET S. MINEER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UT AH, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
ROBERT W. ROSKELLEY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 14696 
Case No. 14728 
Brief of Defendants 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is a consolidated action involving two separate Plaintiffs and common questiodli · 
of law before the Supreme Court of Utah pursuant to UCA 35-4-lO(i), 1953, as~ 
for the purpose of Judicial Review of and determination of the lawfulness of decisions of 
the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, affirming the decisions of the 
Appeals Referees denying benefits to both Plaintiffs and assessing an overpayment against 
Plaintiffs on the grounds that each Plaintiff knowingly withheld material facts of his/her 
work and earnings to receive benefits to which he/she was not entitled. The questions are 
whether the findings of fact are supported by the evidence, construction of Section 35-4-5(e) 
of the Utah Employment Security Act, and whether said section as applied violates the due 
process and equal protection clauses of the Constitutions of Utah and the United States. 
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DISPOSITION BY BOARD OF REVIEW 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Plaintiff Mineer was disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits 
. S2 weeks and an overpayment assessed against Plaintiff in the amount of $1,640.00 in a 
by a Hearing Representative of the Department of Employment Security dated 
Mlmmry· 19, 1976. The decision was affirmed by a Department Appeals Referee in a 
dated April 16, 1976, and the decision of the Appeals Referee was affirmed by the 
of Review in a decision dated June 30, 1976, in Case No. 76-A-800, 76-BR-85. 
for 52 weeks and an overpayment assessed against said Plaintiff in the amount of 
in a decision by a Hearing Representative of the Department of Employment 
4ated January 26, 1976, as amended February 9, 1976. The decision was affirmed 
lllllpartmi:ot Appeals Referee in a decision dated May 4, 1976, and the decision of the 
lleferee was affirmed by the Board of Review in a decision dated July 28, 1976, 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants Department of Employment Security and Board of Review of the Industrial 
,.,.,;') . 
c~:·e, . nssion of Utah seek affirmation of the decisions denying benefits to Plaintiffs and 
~overpayments on the grounds that the findings of fact in each case are supported 
., hr the evidence and are conclusive; that the findings of fact and decisions comply with 
Defendant's regulations; and that Section 35-4-5(e) of the Utah Employment Security Act as 
applied does not violate the due process and/or equal protection clauses of the 
Constitutions of Utah and the United States. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(A) PLAINTIFF MINEER 
Plaintiff Margaret S. Mineer initiated an interstate claim for unemployment benefits on 
September 5, 1974, in Pasco, Washington. Her claim was approved with an effective date of 
September 1, 1974, and her benefit was determined to be $57.00 per week, not to exceed 36 
2 
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weeks. Plaintiff subsequently filed a new claim for a new b fit ff · ene 1 year e ective November 2, 
1975. It was approved and her benefit on this claim was determined t b s38 00 o e . per week, 
not to exceed 14 weeks. (R0036) 
On October 15, 1974, the Plaintiff filed an interstate claim for unemployment benefits 
for the calendar weeks ended October 5, 1974, and October 12, 1974, certifying thereon that 
she did not work and had no earnings and also that she was not in training or attending 
school during said weeks. (R0029) 
Plaintiff in fact did work and had earnings during the week ending October 5, 1974, 
and knowingly failed to report said material facts regarding her work and earnings to obtain : 
benefits to which she was not entitled. (R0019, R0020) 
Pursuant to Section 35-4-5(e) of the Utah Employment Security Act, Plaim.tiff .. ~\ 
disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits for the 52-week period •--m111111111lflllil!111 
the amount of $1,640.00 for benefits paid to Plaintiff during the disq!l'tlll•l!lltllt;Jlll 
(ROOlO) 
(B) PLAINTIFF ROSKELLEY 
Plaintiff Robert W. Roskelley initiated a claim for unemployment beufits t>ll 
1975. His claim was approved and his benefit was determined to be $93.00 per wd. 
an effective date of January 5, 1975. Plaintiff subsequently filed a new dllim flF: .': 
claim of $66.00. (R0009) 
·'•, 
On or about April 20, 1975, the said Plaintiff filed a weekly claim for benefits b •. 
week ending April 19, 1975, certifying thereon that he worked no hours and had BO earalap 
during said week. (R0030) Plaintiff in fact did work three days and had earnings of $116.U •. 
'\; 
during said week in question and knowingly failed to report said material facts to ..;;:.··~, 
'-. ~.:~ ... 
benefits to which he was not entitled. (R0012, R0029, R0032) -. ., 
On or about the 27th day of April 1975, the Plaintiff filed a weekly claim for benefits 
for the week ending April 26, 1975, certifying thereon that he worked twenty-two hours for 
3 
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ABC Construction and earned $132.41 during said week ending April 26, 1975, and that he 
started work on April 22, 1975. (R0031) Plaintiff in fact started work for said employer on 
April 14, 1975, (R0013) and earned $255.04 the week ending April 26, 1975. (R0032) 
Pursuant to Section 35-4-5(e) of the Utah Employment Security Act, Plaintiff was 
disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits for the 52-week period commencing with 
the calendar week ending April 19, 1975, and an overpayment was assessed against him in 
the amount of $1,674.00 for benefits paid to Plaintiff Roskelley during the disqualification 
period. (ROOIO) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANTS' REGULATIONS ESTABLISH THE ELEMENTS TO SUS-
TAIN A DISQUALIFICATION FOR FRAUD AND THE STANDARD OF 
PROOF; THE FIVE ELEMENTS SET li'ORTH IN THE REGULATIONS ARE 
PRESENT IN EACH OF THESE CASES AND THE DISQUALIFICATION 
FOR FRAUD IN EACH WAS PROPERLY IMPOSED: THE FINDINGS OF 
THE REFEREE IN EACH CASE ARE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE SAID 
REGULATIONS AND ARE VALID. THE ISSUE OF FAULT RAISED BY 
THE PLAINTIFFS IS NOT PERTINENT HERE, BUT IF IT DID APPLY THE 
REFEREE WOULD BE JUSTIFIED IN FINDING EACH PLAINTIFF TO BE 
AT FAULT. 
The provision of the Utah Employment Security Act involved in this appeal is Section 
35-4-S(e): 
An individual shall be ineligible for benefits or for purposes of establishing a 
waiting period: 
For the week with respect to which he had willfully made a false statement or 
representation or knowingly failed to report a material fact to obtain any 
benefit under the provisions of this Act, and for the SI-week period immediately 
following and until he has repaid to the fund all monies he received by reason of 
his fraud and which he received during such following 51-week disqualification 
period, provided that determinations under this subsection shall be . made o~ly 
upon a sworn written admission, or after due notice and recorded hearmg; provid-
ed that when a claimant waives the recorded hearing a.determination shall be 
made based upon all of the facts which the Commission, exercising due diligence, 
has been able to obtain; and provided further that such determination shall b_e 
appealable in the manner provided by this Act for appeals from other benefit 
determinations. 
4 
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Defendant's regulations explaining and clarifying said section of the law are contained 
in the General Rules of Adjudication of the Utah Department of Employment Security is-
sued in April 1976. The pertinent provisions thereof are: 
G_ode ~4~. l . The meaning . of the Act is clear as it pertains to the period of 
d1squahf1cahon, any resultmg overpayment, the necessity of a sworn admission 
or recorded hearing, appeals, etc. There are, however, essential elements that must 
be present before a disqualification can be imposed against any individual for 
fraud. It must be found to exist by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence; not 
presumed. If direct evidence is not present, circumstantial evidence, if clear and 
convincing, is sufficient for establishing a case of fraud. 
In a case involving fraud or misrepresentation, the five following elements 
must be present: 
1. A factual representation, statement, or silence when there is a duty to speak. 
Whether silence amounts to a willful misrepresentation is dependent upon the 
facts of the situation and the intent of the party who fails to speak. 
2. The materiality of the statement, representation, or silence. It must be 
shown that the fund was prejudiced by the conduct and that it would have 
affected the individual's right to benefits. A moral wrong is not a violation of 
Section 35-4-5(e) unless it is material. 
3. The falsity of the representation or statement. 
4. The speaker's knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth or knowledge 
of its importance. 
5. The speaker's intention that his representation or sil~nce w~ to be acted upon 
by the person to whom it was made or from whom 1t was withheld. 
In summary, the individual who has either "~fu~y ma~~ a ~als~ statement .or 
representation" or "knowingly failed to report 1s d1squalif1ed if his act was with 
regArd to a "material fact." .... 
An overpayment resulting from a determination ~ssessing ~ ~~ualifica~on 
for fraud includes the total amount of benefits paid to the mdividual d~ 
the disqualification period. The overp~~e'?-t does. not. include any benefits p~d 
for a period after the 52-week disqual1f1cat1on penod 1f such benefits were paid 
prior to discovery of the fraud. 
. . . . · d h · d a claimant who is otherwise After the 52-week d1squahf1cat1on peno ~ expire ' . h m until all 
eligible for benefits may file for s~ch benefits,. but ;iaJ n~~~~~;~! ~eriod have 
monies he received by reason of his fraudffdunbng 1ai~d l(:ms This does not deter 
been repaid, either by cash payment or o set Y v 1 c ai · 
any collection actions by the Department. 
5 
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(A) PLAINTIFF MINEER 
Element number 1 requiring a factual representation or silence when there is a duty to 
speak is satisfied by the response of plaintiff Mineer to questions number 10 and 12 of the 
Continued Interstate Claim filled out by the said plaintiff in Pasco, Washington, (R0019, 
K.0029) wherein she answered "no" to the question: "Did you work or earn wages at any 
time during the calendar week ending October 5, 1974?" In response to question 12-d, 
plaintiff answered "no" to the question: During the week ending October 5, 1974, "were 
3011 in training or attending school?" 
Element 2 as regards materiality is certainly satisfied. The fund was prejudiced by 
reason of the incorrect statement of the plaintiff in that she was paid benefits which she 
Would not have received if she had stated the matter truthfully and correctly. 
Element 3 is satisfied in that there is no question that the statements or responses to 
.cpleStion 10 and question 12 on the Continued Interstate Claim were false. 
·As regards Element number 4 relating to the speaker's knowledge as to the falsity of 
the representation or ignorance of its truth or knowledge of its importance, suffice it to say 
at this point that the finder of the facts was amply justified in finding that this element was 
present. The matter of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the finding by the referee 
and the Board of Review that this element was present will be examined in detail in Point II, 
infra. 
As to Element number 5 respecting the speaker's intention that her representation or 
silence be acted upon by the defendant, an examination of the transcript and the record 
discloses that this element was also amply present justifying the Referee and Board of 
Review in finding it thus. This element also will be considered in greater detail as respects 
the sufficiency of the evidence to support such a finding under Point II, infra. 
(B) PLAINTIFF ROSKELLEY 
Element number 1 requiring a factual representation or silence when there is a duty to 
speak is satisfied by the response of Plaintiff Roskelley to questions number 2a, b, and c of 
the weekly claim form for the week ending April 19, 1975, filled out by said plantiff (R0030) 
wherein he reported no employer, no hours worked and no earnings; further in response to 
6 
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said questions number 2a, b, and c of the weekly claim ~orm ~ th k 
1 ior e wee ended April 26, 
1975, filled out by said plaintiff (R0031) he reported work for ABC c . . 
onstruct1on eight 
hours Tuesday, six hours Wednesday, and eight hours Friday, and earnings of s132.41 ; and 
in response to question number 12 stated that he started work at ABC I A ril 
22 
1975 (R0031). 
nc. on p , 
Element 2 as regards materiality is certainly satisfied. The fund was prejudiced by 
reason of the incorrect statement of the plaintiff in that he was paid benefits which he 
would not have received if he had stated the matter truthfully and correctly. 
Element 3 is satisfied in that there is no question that the statements or responses to 
questions number 2a, b, and c of said weekly claim forms for the week ending April 19, 
1975, and the week ending April 26, 1975, and to question number 12 for the week~ 
April 26, 1975, were false. (R0012, R0013, R0032) 
Regarding Elements number 4 and 5, as in the case of Plaintiff Mineer, tiaQt---. ~ 
to the knowledge of the falsity and intent that it be acted upon by the def h • di l!J. 
examined in detail in Point II, infra. Both elements, as such examination ill Paiat ll ,,.., 
disclose, are amply present justifying the Referee and Board of Review in fmding it thtJs. 
(C) REGARDING BOTH PLAINTIFFS 
Plaintiffs refer to defendant's Regulation 340.2 which relates to Section 35-4-6(4) 
and 35-4-6(e) of the Utah Employment Security Act. 
Section 35-4-6(d). Any person who, by reason of his fraud, has received any sum 
as benefits under this act to which he was not entitled shall be liable to repay 
such sum to the Commission for the fund. If any person, by reason of his Oft 
fault, has received any sum as benefits under this act to which under a re-
determination or decision pursuant to this section, he has been found not en-
titled he shall be liable to repay such sum, and/or shall, in the discretion of the 
Commission be liable to have such sum deducted from any future benefits pay-
able to him.' In any case in which under this subsection a claimant is lia~le to 
repay to the Commission any sum for the fund, such sum. shall be collectable In the 
same manner as provided for contributions due under this act. 
Section 35-4-6(e). If any person has received any sum as ben.efits unde~ this 
act to which under a redetermination or decision he was not entitled, and it has 
been found that he was without fault in the matter, he is not liable to repay such 
sum but shall be liable to have such sum deducted from any fu~ure benefits 
payable to him with respect to the benefit year current at the time of such 
receipt. 
7 
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Rules of Adjudication, Code 340.2 An examination of the above sections of the 
law reveals that overpayments are repayable in definitely specified ways depending 
on where the fault lies or depending on the existence of fraud. The latter, of 
course, must be first established as provided by Section 5(e) (See 340.1) and any re-
sulting overpayment must be repaid to the fund. (See 340.1 concerning re-
stitution of overpayments resulting from disqualifications under Section 5(e).) 
(emphasis added) 
Rules of Adjudication, Code 340. 1 After the 52-week disqualification period 
has expired, a claimant who is otherwise eligible for benefits may file for such 
benefits but may not receive them until all the monies he received by reason 
of his fraud during the disqualification period have been repaid, either by cash 
payment or offset by valid claims. This does not deter any collection actions by 
the Department. 
It is not necessary to apply the second sentence of Section 6(d) because in this situation 
the first sentence of said section of the Act applies. Each plaintiff by reason of his/her 
fraud has received benefits under the Act to which he/she was not entitled and must repay 
such sum to the Commission. The Commission does not have discretion in either case where 
fraud was involved as it has in the case of a person who was not guilty of fraud but who 
.received benefits by reason of his own fault. It is not necessary to go into the question of 
fault nor to consider the Department Regulations referred to by plaintiffs in their brief 
when dealing with ones such as the plaintiffs who have become liable to make restitution by 
reason of fraud under Section 5(e) of the Act. 
Rules of Adjudication, Code 340.2 Fault cannot be assumed and the burden 
of proving that is exists falls to the Department. When a question of fault arises, it 
is usually a question of whether the person properly gave specific information 
having a bearing on his eligibility. In fairness to the individual, it must first be 
found that he had knowledge sufficient to make him think that the information 
might be important. He is then under obligation to make proper inquiry to de-
termine definitely what is required. Inasmuch as each claimant is advised of his 
rights and responsibilities at the beginning of his claim series and since he 
certifies to eligibility requirements when continuing his claims, he should have 
sufficient knowledge to put him on notice that certain subjects might be important 
factors relative to a claim for benefits. The claimant is then under obligation 
to make proper inquiry and failure to do so constitutes fault. In summary, when 
a claimant has knowledge of the importance of certain information but makes 
his own determination that the information is not material of if he just simply 
ignores it, he does so at his own risk. He cannot be relieved of his obligtion to 
speak and his failure to do so places the fault on him. 
Although it is not necessary to consider the tests set forth in the regulations to 
determine fault, if such tests were to be applied the trier of the facts would be amply 
justified in finding that each of the plaintiffs was at fault. It is not critical that the Plaintiff 
8 
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Mineer did not receive a booklet advising her of her rights and responsibilities when she 
initiated her original claim. The important thing is that the Referee be convinced that in fact 
the plaintiff was aware of her rights and responsibilities and that plaintiff had sufficient 
knowledge to put her on notice that certain subjects might be important factors relative to a 
claim for benefits. In this regard the mere fact that in order to receive benefits a form had 
to be completed every two weeks and a response to questions relating to hours worked and 
wages earned of any kind during specific weeks enumerated would put anyone on notice tht 
such information was important relative to a claim for benefits. The same is true with 
respect to the question regarding whether the claimant was in training or attending school 
during the particular weeks (R0029). The same is also true as regards the importance of 
reporting a paycheck when received if a claimant mistakenly did not report the same during 
the week when the hours were actually worked and the money was actually earned (1\0020). 
Plaintiff Mineer in this instance cannot beg the question by saying that she did not receive a 
booklet at the outset when from all the circumstances it is very clear that she was on notice 
that the above-mentioned matters were important factors relative to her claim for benefits. 
She should have answered the questions correctly and made a proper and honest disclosure. 
or at least should have made inquiry. In accordance with the regulations her failure to make 
inquiry constituted fault. 
With respect to Plaintiff Roskelley, it is admitted that he did receive. an 
"Unemployment Insurance Handbook," advising him of his rights and responsibft;ities 
(R0012, R0014, R0015), and that he was aware of its contents and the necessity to complete 
the weekly claim forms correctly and in particular to report his earnings. "I knew I had to 
report the money because the handbook did say that." (R0015) In order to receive benefits 
each week the plaintiff was required to complete the weekly claim form and respond to the 
. . b 
questions therein respecting days and hours worked and date of starting work at a new JO · 
Just above plaintiff's signature each weekly claim card provides: "My statements are 
correct. 1 know the Jaw provides penalties for false statements." It is clear that plaintiff was 
aware of the importance of said information. He ignored the question on his weekly claim 
I . for the week ending April 19, 1975 card regarding hours worked and tota gross earmngs 
9 
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r (llflll30), and be inoorrectly '1ated the dare he '1utod work for ABC Con'1ruction .o~ th• 
~' weekly claim card for the week endmg Apnl 26, 1975 (R003 l). The Referee was 1ust1f1ed m 
~,. 
"~/.:ffiding, in accordance with said regulation 340.2, supra, that Plaintiff Roskelley was at 
'}:;::. 61llt. 
POINT II 
~ •/t THE FINDINGS OF THE REFEREE AND THE BOARD OF REVIEW THAT 
~;:,. EACH OF THE PLAINTIFFS DID KNOWINGLY WITHHOLD THE 
MATERIAL FACTS OF HIS/HER WORK AND EARNINGS ARE SUP-
;:C,··'<"PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND ARE CONCLUSIVE. 
!' .. 
~ ' . It sltould be noted that one known false statement or known failure to re-Port a material fact to obtain a benefit is sufficient to invoke this Section [5(e)] of 
. e Act, (quoted in Point I. supra.) and that the 52-week disqualification then 
*5 effect and weekly benefits thereafter recived within the disqualification 
. although pursuant to submission of perfectly honest weekly claim forms 
•overpayments and must be repaid to the Department. David A. Whitcome v. 
,-~ent of Employment Security and Board of Review of the Industrial Com-
tnisSon of Utah, Utah Supreme Court Case No. 14735, May 1977. 
r . 
~on 35-4-lO(i), Utah Code Annotated 1953, second paragraph, provides in part: 
~; la any judicial proceeding under this section the findings of the commission and 
;,, ·;·tile board of review as to the facts if supported by evidence shall be conclusive 
· ·· · · and the jurisdiction of said court shall be confined to questions of law. 
This Court has consistently from time to time ruled that where the findings of the 
Commission and the Board of Review are supported by evidence, they will not be dis-
,· turbed. In this regard, the Court said in Kennecott Copper Employees v. Department f 
of Employment Security (1962) 13 U. 2d 262, 373 P. 2d 987: 
We are obliged to analyze this determination in accordance with the estab-
lished Rules of Review: that the Evidence is to be looked at in the light most 
favorable to the findings: in so doing, if there is evidence of any substance 
whatever which can reasonably be regarded as supporting the determination 
made, it must be affirmed; and conversely, a reversal and the compelling of 
such an award could be justified only if there was no substantial evidence to 
sustain the determination, and there was proof of facts giving rise to the right 
of compensation so clear and persuasive that the Commission's refusal to 
accept it and make an award was clearly capricious, arbitrary, and unreasonable. 
The findings of the Referee as affirmed by the Board of Review are amply supported 
by the evidence. 
10 
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(A) PLAINTIFF MINEER 
Plaintiff Mineer started work for Albertson's, Inc., in Richland, Washington, on 
October 3, 1974, (ROOI8, R0027, R0031) and worked for one full day and the next day for 
two or three hours. On October 15, 1974, the Plaintiff filled out, signed, and submitted a 
bi-weekly Continued Interstate Claim to the Employment Security Department in Pasco, 
Washington. A copy of this form is Exhibit 1 attached to the transcript (R0029). The 
Plaintiff admits that she filled out said claim and signed the same (R0019). Said claim 
specifically required information regarding work and earnings during the week ending 
October 5, 1974. Plaintiff failed to report the above work and earnings at Albertson's, Ia:~ 
Q This claim doesn't show any work or earnings reported. Question No. 10 asks 
for you to report work and earnings. Will you read Question No. 10 aloud 
for me please. 
A During the week claimed in No. 7 and No. 8 above, did you wort or earn 
wages of any kind? If yes, furnish the information below for each day you 
worked or earned wages. Show wages before deductions. 
Q That has been checked no. Did you check that no. 
A Yes. (R0019) 
In response to the referee's inquiry as to 
the $26.28 which she earned at Albertson's, she responded that she wasn't sure that M 
would be paid and "was more or less being trained." (R0019) 
Q Why did you fail to report the $26.28 you earned from Albertsons during 
the week of October 5th. 
A As I stated before. I didn't think I was going to get paid because when I went 
in for the job the man said if I worked out I could get it and I had never 
worked in a meat maket like that before so I was more or less being trained. 
Q You weren't sure whether you would be paid or not? 
A No. 
Q Question No. 12 states that during the week or weeks claimed in No. 7 and .s 
above, were you and it's got multiple choices here that you answer - it 
states under Item D - in training or attending school, and that's been 
checked no. You told me here that you were in training and I'm wondering why 
you didn't check that yes. 
A Well, at the time - I don't really know it's been so long ago but proba~ly 
because there's such a span of time I probably completely forgot about it. 
(R0019) 
11 
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Tb.e Plaintiff's answers quoted above to the Referee's questions are contradictory and 
:~e. First the Plaintiff said she didn't think she was going to be paid because she was 
0r less being trained. In this day and age one would be hard put to find a training 
where the employee is not being paid while he is being trained. Be that as it may, if 
' 'ff did genuinely and sincerely feel that she was in a training program, she can't 
-Why then she failed to indicate in response to question 12-d that she was engaged in 
- program at Albertson's. Her answer, "Well, at the time - I don't really know 
so kmg ago but probably because there's such a span of time I probably completely 
of her failure to report that she was in training. 
two to four weeks later the plaintiff was in fact paid by Albertson's, Inc., for her 
U)di.obc:r 3 and 4, 1974 (R0019). Certainly at this point Plaintiff was aware that she 
lijl!DrltiJ!lt! for wages at Albertson's on the two days in question. However, when she 
Albertson's, she failed to report said work and earnings. 
, Wtn you still filing for benefits when Albertsons did pay you? 
Q Why didn't you report the information at that time. 
A I really didn't know I had to. 
Q Didn't you know you had to report all work and earnings while filing for 
benefits? 
A No. $26.00 I didn't. 
Q Question No. 10 that you read a moment ago states during the weeks claimed 
in No. 7 and No. 8 above did you work or earn wages of any kind? That 
requires a yes or no answer and you indicated no on that claim. 
A I didn't know I was being paid. 
Q Then on the week you did get paid you would have had earnings and still 
apparently you indicated no. I don't see any claims in the record that were filed 
for the next 3-4 weeks on which you recorded any work or earnings. 
A No, it wasn't. (R0020) 
12 
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A further point which goes to the credibility of the Plaintiff was the fact that she 
misrepresented employers contacted when filling out Item #15 on S";d C t' d I 
... on mue nterstate 
Claim (R0030). In listing employers, etc., she had contacted regarding work she did not list 
Albertson's as having been contacted, when she did make contact and had actually worked 
there during the week in question. 
The Plaintiff does not dispute that she did work at Albertson's and ea.med $26.ll 
during the week ending October 5, 1974, nor does she dispute that she failed tor~ tllo: 
same. 
(B) PLAINTIFF ROSKELLEY 
On April 20, 1975, Plaintiff Roskelley signed and filed a weekly 
Defendant for the week ending April 19, 1975, (R0012, R0030) whereon he• 
had not worked any hours and had no earnings. Plaintiff admits tUt: i., 
said week for ABC Inc. and earned $126.11 ($132.41) (R0031) ~.,, 
Q I have here a report of earnings from Associated BrlPam · 
It has a date of 25 November 1975 and it shows that durimg die 
13, to April 19, 1975, you worked for them and earned $126.U. 
if that information is correct or not? 
A When's this? 
Q The period April 13 to April 19, 1975. 
A Yes. (R0012) 
On the weekly claim card for the week ending April 26, 1975, which Pllllinllil& 
filled out on April 27, 1975, he reported a false back to work date of 
Plaintiff actually started work at ABC Inc. on April 14, 1975. (R0013, J.tQOg, 
Plaintiff's purpose was to be consistent with a false representation on his claim Glt:llll 
week ending April 19, 1975, that he worked no hours and had no eamings, 
misrepresentation of the date of starting work on April 22, 1975, follows. If he 
genuinely mistaken as regards reporting the hours worked and the earnings on the caret for 
the week when he actually received his pay, he would have reported the correct date he 
returned to work and not been concerned with the need to cover up to avoid discovery of his 
prior misrepresentation. (a la Watergate) 
13 
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,.,@! . 
. ' ~i;.'r-: Plaintiff's explanation that he did not know how to fill out his weekly claim card for 
~~~week ending April 19, 1975, is not believable. (R0013, R0014) All he had to do was 
~~~~-.. -
~1:1-ilwc'1' the questions on the card, i.e., 
2. If you worked during the week shown above, complete 
a, b,c, d 
a - name and address of employer ----------------
b - Total hours worked each day (box labeled for each day of the week 
with space to fill in the hours worked on the particular day) 
· . c - Total gross earnings (before deductions) whether paid or not 
were: ----------~ 
d - Check reason for separation from above employment: 
O reduction of force, D other (explain on reverse) 
atified that Jae received the Unemployment Insurance Handbook and had read 
2. ll0015) Any qaestioo that Plaintiff might have had after reading the plain 
above for completing Item 2 of the weekly claim card would have been 
by the handbook. Quoting from the decision of the Appeals Referee: 
·1' !, 
·~ ''Unemloyment Insurance Handbook" which the claimant received clearly 
';.~ that all work and earnings should be reported for the week in which the 
· Hrvices were performed although the claimant may not yet have been paid. In 
• addition there is an example showing how the claim should be completed .... 
(1..0010) 
Plaintiff Roskelley worked during the week ending April 26, 1975, and earned $255.04. 
(R0032) Having worked that week Plaintiff cannot claim that it makes no difference as 
just simply being reported in the wrong week because it resulted in Plaintiff receiving 
11Ddeserved benefits. He did not atempt to pay them back until the Defendant contacted the 
Plaintiff as part of its investigation of the matter. (R0025) 
In light of the testimony, exhibits and other evidence in the record above cited, the 
Referee and Board of Review were justifiably convinced that the Plaintiff Mineer when 
filing said Interstate Claims and the Plaintiff Roskelley when filing said weekly claims, 
knowingly withheld the material facts of his/her said work and earnings to obtain benefits 
to which he/she was not entitled. The evidence in support of the decisions as reviewed here-
in was clear, cogent and convincing, and thus satisfied and exceeded the standard of proof 
14 
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required by the regulations of Defendant (General Rules of Adjudication, Code 340.1) The 
decisions of the Referee and the Board of Review being supported by the evidence are 
therefore conclusive. (UCA 35-4-lO(i) 
POINT III 
SECTION 35-4-5(e), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED, IS 
CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS AND REQUIRES THAT AN INDIVIDUAL 
SHALL BE INELIGIBLE FOR BENEFITS OR FOR ESTABLISHING A 
WAITING WEEK FOR THE WEEK WITH RESPECT TO WHICH HE DID 
THE ACTS OR OMISSIONS SPECIFIED IN THE LAW AND FOR TlJE 
51-WEEK PERIOD IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING. IT CANNOT BE CON-
STRUED TO IMPOSE THE DISQUALIFICATION PERIOD PROSPECTIVB-
LY. 
Section 35-4-5 of the Utah Employment Security Act sets forth various criteria foli 
termining that an individual shall be ineligible for unemployment insurance tt.e&s. 
of the factors which cause ineligibility for varying periods of time are as folows: 
a. Voluntarily leaving work without good cause - 2 to 6 wma iBllidldUtj 
starting with the week he voluntarily left work without good cause. 
b. Being discharged for misconduct - 2 to 10 weeks inelipDility, 
with the week discharged. 
c. Failure without good cause to apply for or accept available suitable wO.tk· ' 4 · 
2 to 6 weeks ineligibility, starting with the w~ek of such failure. 
d. Unemployment due to stoppage of work because of strike - startiai ~" ;;) 
-~ . " 
the first week a specified individual is unemployed due to a strike and. ccm-
tinuing each week during said strike. 
e. Willfully making a false statement or representation or knowingly failing to 
report a material fact to obtain a benefit under the act - 52 weeks ineligibility 
starting with the week of the false representation or failure to report a 
material fact. 
f. Receiving or seeking benefits from some other state - starting the first 
week and continuing during each week that he receives or is seeking unemploy-
ment insurance benefits in another jurisdiction. 
15 
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~ Registered at and attending school - starting the first week and continuing 
·'. , during each week that he is registered at and attending school. 
. a.=ving or entitled to receive wages in lieu of notice, accrued vacation, 
'~ *· _ starting the first week and continuing during each week that he 
,ti,ceives, or is entitled to receive, said wages in lieu of notice, accrued vaca-
. ,. 
; • wds employed by institutions of higher education during summer vaca-
. ~ vacation between terms - starting the first week and continuing dur-
•·eadt week of said vacations. 
specifies that the ineligibility shall start the 
the particular condition or circumstance is extant and not the week that 
tfile 52-week disqualification period of Section 5(e) is a long and harsh 
• However, there are other disqualifications mentioned above which could be 
~jliislp~ifk:ation under "g" for being registered at and attending school would 
for several years. Item "d", unemployment due to stoppage of work 
~e. could continue for an indefinite period of time. It is true that of all of the 
mentioned above which could cause a disqualification, the one which is most 
.result in an overpayment is ·the 5(e) fraud provision which is involved in this 
Under item "c," failure to apply for or accept available suitable work, frequently 
· ~ will be paid before the failur~ is discovered and an overpayment will have accrued . 
.. Vmlm the other disqualifications there will not usually be an overpayment involved unless 
·t'he claimant has misrepresented or failed to disclose, in other words, unless there is a 
Section 5(e) fraud involved. For example, under item "g," registered at and attending 
school, a claimant on his original claim for unemployment benefits might misrepresent that 
he was not registered at and attending school when he actually was attending school. In such 
case he would receive unemployment benefits in the usual course until it was discovered that 
he was not eligible because of school attendance. The benefits he received during the 
disqualification period would constitute an overpayment and Section 5(e) would apply as 
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well as 5(g)-5(e) because he knowingly failed to report the m t 'al .. f . 
a en 1act o his school 
attendance to obtain benefits. 
With respect to those disqualifications mentioned above which set a specific number of 
weeks of disqualification, the disqualification for fraud 5(e) is by f th 1 · 
, , ar e ongest, i.e., 52 
weeks. It is understandable that the Legislature was reasonably and justifiably most 
concerned with fraud as compared with the other reasons justifying disqualification. Thu 
in order to discourage the obtaining of benefits through "fraud" as it is defined in the~' 
the Legislature set up the 52-week disqualification, starting with the week with 
which the fraud was committed. 
Section 5(e) of the Act is not ambiguous and is clear as to when the 
period shall start. No doubt there are those who do not agree with the way ti.. 
and think that some other way would be better. Until the Legislature chaupai61 
courts declare it to be unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, we have no chofd 118 
what the Legislature has done. 
If the law were to provide as Plaintiffs propose to change it the sa:m: ..r. 
could occur. Under the hypothetical scheme Plaintiffs propose if A he 
disqualification period invoked as of the date that the fraud is discovered, 
any benefits. If B does not have a job during a similar disqualification pellio.r; 
benefits which he would have been entitled to except for the discovery of his · . 
would have suffered no actual loss of benefits because he had a job, whereas• 
felt the sting of the disqualification and been deprived of benefits because he ¥Ml·· 
job during the disqualification period as proposed by Plaintiffs. 
Under the plan which Plaintiffs propose as well as under the law as it presedy st 
the individual who has a job during the disqualification period will not feel the sting otttf 
disqualification, whereas under both the person who is out of work during tlW 
disqualification period will feel the sting of the disqualification. Under the law as it s~ ~ 
the individual must repay to the Department the benefits mistakenly paid to him when lleWal·· 
not eligible. Under the plan of Plaintiffs the disqualified individual normally would not 
h. · Ii 'bl d he would have to repay benefits because the Department would declare im me g1 e an 
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,-1 
r:llOlTeOcive benefits. The net effect;, the •wne in both '"''"· Undec the law "' it ;, the 
~, , .-
~~/--ble claimant receives benefits prior to discovery of the fraud which me must repay; 
...,i:.,.· . 
under Plaintiffs' plan he would receive no benefits. In both cases he comes out with 
One Porsche, 526 P 2d 917 (1974) in 
• brief regarding penalty, forfeiture, and excessiveness of the penalty. It would seem that 
"ty (3 to 2) held in One Porsche that the purpose of the criminal statute involved in 
was to deter the transportation of a controlled substance for distribution and not 
. possession and consumption. Reference is made in the decision to absurd results 
apply from enforcement of the literal wording of the statute respecting possession 
m the majority of the court felt were not in line with the intent of the 
Tlte dissent seemed satisfied from the record that Defendant was engaged in 
a controlled substance for distribution while the majority felt that the 
the Court mentions the point of harshness of the penalty as applied to 
ki!IRssession of marijuana and the idea that forfeitures are frowned upon in law, it 
appear that the decision was really based upon the fact that the statute was aimed at 
_..., .... ;ation for purpose of distribution and not possession, and the Court would not 
the rigorous forfeiture provision in a case not within the intent and purpose of the 
· ~lamre, i.e., possession for personal consumption. 
The Section 5(e) disqualification which is before the court is not a penalty in the sense 
that Plaintiffs are assessed with a charge for wrongctoing such as a fine. By committing the 
"fraud" as defined in the Act, the Plaintiffs became ineligible for benefits for a 52-week 
period of time. The money which he/she received while ineligible each held as a trustee. It 
did not belong to them. Each has a duty to return it to the rightful owner, i.e., the 
Unemployment Compensation Fund. 
The Section 5(e) disqualification is also not a forfeiture in the sense of a divestiture of 
property without compensation. (36 Am. Jur. 2d, Forfeiture and Penalties, Section I.) The 
money received by Plaintiffs during the disqualification period did not belong to him/her. 
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In the One Porsche case, supra, the defendant owned the car originally and the proceeding 
was to transfer title to the sovereign. Here, the proceeding in question is a matter of 
recovering back from the Plaintiffs money which belongs to the Fund which Plaintiffs hold 
as trustees for the benefit of the Fund. 
The purpose of the Employment Security Act is to assist those unemployed persons 
who are entitled to cash benefits, and the purpose of Section 5(e) of the Act is to discoiirage 
fruad and to encourage honesty and complete and full disclosure on the part of all claimants 
for benefits under the Act. The Legislature has deemed it proper in order to achieve ks saitl 
purpose of honesty and full disclosure, to require a rigorous deprivation of benefits in .. tke. ·j< 
nature of a penalty against a person for fraud as it is defined in the Act. CertaiDly to ~ ·• :: , 
the sort of fraudulent conduct which the trier of the facts has found to have l!llla. ~- "'!;· . 
~. •• • 'i<--.:. .. 
mitted by the Plaintiffs in this case was directly within this purpose of tile I .,;ew... . •,;:~ 
The Utah Supreme Court has already considered the severity of sllclJ depriutiaa f!!t · 
benefits in the case of Decker v. Industrial Commission. Depart,,,.,, tlf .,,.,,,. •• 
Security, 533 P. 2d 898 (1975) and found that "under the statute it does not appeu ~' 
fact finder or this court has the discretion to reduce or to forgive any part of tbe paid,lrtJ 
The ruling in Decker, supra, would seem to be controlling in this instance. 
POINT IV 
SECTION 35-4-5(e), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDBD; 
DOES NOT VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSES OF THE CQN... 
STITUTIONS OF UTAH AND THE UNITED STATES. 
Plaintiffs state on page 19 of their brief that it is a requirement of Defendants that the 
funds received by Plaintiffs during their 52-week disqualification period must be repaid 
before either will again be eligible for unemployment compensation. This is not correct. The 
requirements of Defendants in this regard are set forth in Defendant's General Rules of 
Adjudication, Code 340.1, quoted supra under Point I. 
--
After the 52-week disqualification period has expired, a claimant who . is 
otherwise eligible for benefits may file for such benefits, but may not receive 
them until all the monies he received by reason of his fraud during the disqualifica-
tion period have been repaid, either by cash payment or offset by valid claims. 
This does not deter any collection action by the Department. 
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·/. 
After the 52-we~k disqualification period has expired the Plaintiffs can again file for 
benefits. He/she must meet all of the other eligibility requirements of the law. If he/she 
does, be/she will be entitled to Unemployment Compensation Benefits but would not 
actually receive them because they would be set off against the amount of the overpayment 
owed by Plaintiffs to the Fund. When the full amount owed has been offset, Plaintiffs 
would then be entitled to receive the weekly cash benefits so long as he/she is still eligible. 
Section 5(e) and Section 6(d) of the Utah Employment Security Act clearly do not 
operate arbitrarily or capriciously or unreasonably. It would seem to be quite normal and 
reuonable to offset the amount due from a claimant on an overpayment before paying a 
dllialllnt benefits in a new benefit year. 
U.C.A. 35-4-22(d) (1) "Benefit year" means the 52 consecutive week period 
Mcinning with the first week with respect to which an individual files for 
benefits and is found to have an insured status. 
Also said sections do have a very real and substantial relation to the object of the act to 
r provide benefits to those entitled to them and to discourage fraud and to encourage 
,. 
': llCnesty and full disclosure on the part of claimants for benefits. ~·.· 
~ 
"' POINTV 
SECTION 35-4-5(e) AS APPLIED BY DEFENDANTS DOES NOT DENY 
PLAINTIFFS EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW UNDER THE CON-
STITUTIONS OF UTAH AND THE UNITED ST ATES. 
There is nothing in the constitution which guarantees unemployment compensa-
tion to any person. Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 531 P. 2d 870 
(1975). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Townsend v. Board of Review of the Industrial Com-
mission, 493 P. 2d 614 (1972) considered the Utah Employment Security Act in connec-
tion with equal protection of the law guaranteed by the constitution of Utah and the United 
States. The Court quoted from Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S. Ct. 1153, 25 L. 
Ed. 2d 491 (1970) in enunciating the rule: 
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are im-
perfect. If the classification has some "reasonable basis," it does not offend .the 
Constitution simply because the classification "is not made with mathematical 
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nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality." (Citation) "The prob-
lem of government are practical ones and may justify if they do not require 
rough acco~~o~ati~ns - illogical, it may be, and un;cientific," (Citation) "A 
statutory. d1scnmmat1on will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may 
be conceived to justify it." (Citation) 
* * * * * 
. . · But the E9ual Protection Clause does not require that a State must choose 
be~we~n atta~kmg every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all. 
(C1tat1on) It 1s enough that the State's action be rationally based and free from 
individious discrimination .... 
It is hard to think of a more reasonable or logical classification than the one in this 
case. Those who have received benefits to which they were not entitled must repay them. 
Those who have not received benefits that they were not entitled to have nothing to repay. 
The classification which Plaintiffs complain of is really the basic classification of the 
Employment Security Law. Those who are not employed and otherwise eligible reGC!in 
money each week from an agency of the Government. Those individuals who are D drflld_ 
and working receive no such weekly payment. If employed people received the - J&Y-
ment each week from the agency as those who are unemployed, then the classification whieh 
the Plaintiffs complain of would no longer exist. 
CONCLUSION 
The findings of fact and decisions of the Appeals Referee as affirmed by the Board of 
Review in respect to both Plaintiffs are in compliance with Defendant's regulations relating 
to fraud and standard of proof. The evidence in support of the decisions in both case$ .. 
substantially exceeds the test of Kennecott Copper Employees v. Department of 
Employment Security, supra page 10, that "if there is evidence of any substance whatever 
which can reasonably be regarded as supporting the determination made, it must be 
affirmed." 
u.C.A. 35-4-5(e) 1953, as amended, is clear and unambiguous and cannot be construed 
to impose the disqualification period prospectively after the date of the discovery of the 
fraud as Plaintiffs propose. Said Section 5(e) as applied does not violate Due Process or 
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Equal Protection. After the 52-week disqualification period has expired, if Plaintiffs are 
otherwise eligible, each may qualify for benefits. They would be applied on the 
overpayment owed by each Plaintiff to the Department. Such procedure of applying 
atenring benefits on the overpayment rather than paying directly to Plaintiffs is quite 
normal and not at all arbitrary or capricious. The classification complained of by Plaintiffs 
is "rationally based and free from invidious discrimination.'' Dandridge v. Williams, supra 
page 20. The decision of the Referee and the Board of Review in this case should, therefore, 
t.e affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS 
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Attorney General 
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